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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ASPEN ACRES ASSOCIATION, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SEVEN ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Corpora ti on, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12825 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in which respondent (plaintiff be-
low) an association of owners of lots within a subdivision 
sought to obtain title to the water system serving the 
subdivision and an easement across lands of defendant 
(appellant herein) in connection with the road system 
leading to and within the subdivision. 
DISPOSITION OF LO,VER COURT 
The Lower Court ordered defendant to convey the 
water system and its components to plaintiff, and per-
mitted plaintiff the right to enter upon the roads and 
2 
"immediately adjacent hmcl" (of the clef endants) to 
maintain and imprm'e the roads arnl restrict access there-
to, and further imposed upon defendant the obligation 
to guarantee the performance of plaintiff's duties to-
ward the members of plaintiff Association. 
RELIEF SOFtaIT ON APPEAL 
Uef endant seeks a partial reversal of the judgment 
awarded to plaintiff against the defendant insofar as 
the judgment awards title of the water system to plain-
tiff (a11d other matters arising therefrom) and insofar 
as the judgme11t grants plaintiff the right to control 
the access to the property, and insofar as the judgment 
requires defendant to guarantee the duties which the 
plaintiff Association owes to its members. 
STA'l'El\IE:N"T OF FACTS 
This action concerns rights of the various parties in 
a parcel of property known as "Aspen Acres" more 
fully described as the East 1h of Section 27, Township 
1 North, Range 7 East, S. L.B.&l\I., which is situated 
in Summit County, State of Utah, containing 320 acres. 
Prior to the obtaining of any interest in that real prop-
erty by any party to this law suit, title thereto was vested 
in Aspen ... L\cres Inc. Aspen Acres Inc. was a Utah cor-
poration organized for profit whose stock was owned by 
:l\Iax Bateman ( 50%), who se1Te<l as president, and J. 
Reed Tuft ( 50%) who served as secretary. :Mr. Tuft 
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also served as attorney for Aspen Acres Inc. during the 
entire existence of the corporation ( R. 330). On l\Iay 
7, 1962, Aspen Acres Inc. had commenced the develop-
ment of a mountain home subdivision comprising 150 
lots of approximately one-half acre each. In order to 
avoid confusion, Aspen Acres Inc. (which is not a party 
to this action) will be refeITed to as "the Developer." 
Aspen Acres Association (plaintiff herein) will be re-
ferred to as "the Association" or "Plaintiff". 
The subdivision thus formed by the Developer was 
isolated from the public road by a strip of land (com-
prising approximately 100 acres) owned by the Develop-
er, hut each contract by which lots within the subdivision 
were sold contained the following language: "The seller 
agrees to share water from unnamed spring and pipe 
to tract. The seller guarantees right-of-way to and from 
property. The seller reserves right-of-way for construc-
tion and maintenance of pipeline and power transmis-
sion lines." 
Originally, access to the subdivision was provided 
over adjoining land owned by a l\1r. Stillman. But some 
time in 1961 the point of access was changed to its 
present location, which is over land then owned by the 
Developer. 
In creating the subdiYision, the Developer did not 
reserve title to the streets within the subdivision, but 
di,~ided the lots so that each lot went to the center of 
the street. Each conveyance of a lot expressly reserved 
a right-of-way in the streets" .... for the use and bene-
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fit of any person now owning or who may acquire prop-
erty in the tract krnrn n as Aspen Acres." (Exhibits IO, 
18, IO and 28.) 
On or about August :W, I962, a meeting was held 
at the I-Iotel Utah for the purpose of forming a non-
profit organi:wtion for the mvners of property in Aspen 
Acres. A written notice of the meeting signecl by l\lax 
l3ateman was sent to all lot owners (R. I8I). A copy 
of the notice was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 3. 
After stating the time and place of the meeting, the 
notice said: "At this time we will want to elect officers 
and discuss the advisability of keeping the road to the 
area accessable during the winter months. Other mat-
ters that should he discussed are garbage service, main-
1 
tenance of roads and water lines." (Exhibit a). 
At the meeting l\lax llateman introduced his at-
torney David Salisbury who displayed some articles 
and by-laws for the formation of a non-profit corpora-
tion ( H. 2I I). l\Ir. Salisbury further explained that the 
reason for the formation of the association was that 
Bateman was leaving the area and intended to divorce 
himself from the responsibilities of maintaining the 
water system and roads; that he was turning the whole 
thing ewer to the Association for which the Association 
woulcl he responsible ( R. 2I2). 
The Articles of Incorporation of Aspen Acres As-
sociation, a non-profit corporation, (plaintiff and re-
spondent herein) were filed in the office of the Secre-
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tary of State of the State of Utah on September 12, 
1962. (See Exhibit 9 containing the Aiticles, By-Laws 
and l\Iinutes of plaintiff Association.) On October 30, 
1 HG2, a meeting of the Board of Directors of the plain-
tiff Association was held at which "It was the consensus 
that we [the Association] should secure a commitment 
from l\Ir. Bateman as to how much water and what 
rights he intends to convey to the Association .... " (Ex-
hibit 9-See l\Ii1mtes of .1\Ieeting October 30, 1962). 
At the direction of the Board of Directors, Kenneth 
L. Stahr as president of the Association wrote a leth:~ 
to .Max Bateman on November 2, 1962, in which he 
stated that the Association desired to know what water 
rights l3ateman intended to transfer. A copy of this let-
ter was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14. 
On or about January 25, 1963, the Developer cor-
poration and .1\Iax Bateman individually, jointly and 
se\'erally deeded to the plaintiff Association certain 
water rights described in a written "Agreement of 
Transfer" which was introduced into evidence as Ex-
hibit 13. The exhibit stated as follows: "These water 
rights and [water] stock certificates are executed and 
delivered to Aspen Acres Associated for the benefit of 
those persons and corporations now owning lots in Aspen 
Acres Incorporated Subdivision, and for the benefit of 
those who may hereafter own land therein. Said water 
rights shall be distributed to said beneficiaries in accord-
ance with the Articles of the Association of the 
grantee." 
Th clef e11dant corporation was formed in l\Iarch, 
1!Hi3, as the culmination of about four months of nego-
tiations. These negotiations started when one of the lot 
owners ('\Talton Farmer) found out that the Developer 
intended to sell out its remaining interests to a group of 
people from Phoenix. 
l\I r. Farmer first proposed that the Association buy 
the property from the Developer. ( ll. 288.) \,Vhen this 
was refused, l\[r. Farmer tried to interest all lot owners 
in the purchase. ( ll. 287, 288.) Finally, seven lot owners 
got together awl formed Seven Associates, Inc. (de-
f encla11t and appellant herein.) ( R. 288.) Harold G. 
Blumenthal was elected president of the defendant an<l 
Kenneth L. Stahr (the same person who was the presi-
dent of the plaintiff Association) was elected secretary. 
l\Ir. Stahr continued to act in this dual capacity until 
l\Iay, 1H67. (.Exhibit 9.) 
On or about l\Iarcl1 27, 1963, the Developer corpor-
ation entered into a contract with the clefendant by the 
terms of which defendant purchased from the Develop-
er, for the sum of $10~3,000.00, the lands remaining un-
developed in the said one-half section, and eighteen lots 
within the subdivision owned by the Developer. A copy 
of the Purchase Agreement was admitted into evidence 
as .Exhibit IG. By the terms of the Contract of Sale, 
the Developer specifically agreed to sell to the def en-
dant " ... all water systems and any development in con-
nection with such water systems appurtenant to said real 
estate .... " '1.'he defendant also specifically assumed the 
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liability and responsibility with respect to the water 
system for the purpose of running lines to fifteen lots 
specifically identified in the contract (four of which lots 
were included in the group purchased by defendant). 
The contract then provided: "The above liabilities to be 
incurred by buyer [defendant] are to be limited to the 
above lots." (See Exhibit 16, Paragraph 4.) 
In the years intervening bewteen .l\1arch 27, 1963, 
and the present date, both plaintiff Association and the 
defendant have expended sums of money to maintain 
J 
the roads leading to aucl throughout the subdivision an(1 
also to maintain the water system. Defendant also 
sought to subdivide some of the undeveloped acreage 
a<ljoining the subdivision, but disputes developed over 
water when defendant connected its newly developed 
subdivision into the existing water system. Over the 
years there have been negotiations between plaintiff and 
defendant with respect to the use of the water system, 
and the sufficiency of the water rights and questions 
have arisen between them as to the persons intended to 
be benefitted by the conveyance of water rights to the 
plaintiff Association. 
Plaintiff took the position that membership in the 
Association and beneficial use of the water rights con-
veyed to it should be restricted to the owners of those 
lots which were in existence on September 12, 1962, 
whereas defendant took the position that any person 
who became the owner of property situated within the 
one-half section tract was entitled to become a member 
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of the Association upon payment of dues and could 
share in the water rights to the extent water was avail-
ahle. In this action, the Lower Court held that member-
~hip was available to anyone owning property within 
the one-half section tract, but that water should he made 
available to members of the Association on a priority 
basis established by the dates of their purchase of prop-
erty within the tract. Neither party has appealed from 
these holdings. 
The Court also held, however, that the plaintiff 
Association was entitled to the ownership of the water 
system (based upon an Agreement dated .l\Iay 22, 1963, 
which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 15), and 
also that the plaintiff Association had the right to re-
strict access and otherwise control the rights of all prop-
erty owners in the one-half section tract to the use of 
existing roads not only within the subdivision but also 
outside of the subdivided areas. The Court failed to 
make any finding with respect to an issue raised by de-
fernlant's counterclaim that it was entitled to an ease-
ment in common with the other property owners over the 
roads within the subdi,·ision in order to gain access to 
defendant's land lying beyond the subdivision. The 
Court further imposed upon the defendant the burden 
of guaranteeing all of the duties which the plaintiff 
Association owes to its members. Defendant appealed 
from all of these latter determinations. 
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
POIN1' I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF AS-
SOCIATION OvVNS THE 'v ATER SYSTEl\I, 
STORAGE TANKS, CONDUITS AND 11\1-
PROVEl\IENTS, IN FINDING THAT EX-
HIBIT 1.5 IS A VALID CONTRACT, AND IN 
RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROl\I l\IAK-
ING ANY ATTACI-11\IENTS TO OR l\IODIFI-
CATIONS OF THE ''r ATER SYSTEl\I. 
POIN1' II. THE COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIA-
TION THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE 
EASEMENTS WITHIN AND \VITHOUT 
THE SUBDIVISION, AND IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN 
EASEl\IENT ACROSS THE ROADS WITHIN 
THE SUBDIVISION FOR ACCESS TO ITS 
LANDS OWNED BY DEI~'ENDANT. 
POINT III. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN 
HOLDING TI-I AT DEFENDANT :MUST 
GUARANTEE THE DUTIES \VHICH THE 
PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OWES TO ITS 
l\IEl\IBERS, AND IN ESTOPPING DEFEND-
ANT FROlH DENYING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF ASSOCIATION IS ITS AGENT. 
]() 
AHGUl\IENT 
POIX1' 1. THE TRIAL COURT ElUlED 
IX IIOLDING TIIAT TIIE PLAINTIFI•-. AS-
SOC IATIOX U\VNS TIIE 'VA'l'ER SYSTEl\1, 
STOHAGE TANKS, CONDUITS AND Il\I-
PROVEl\IENTS, IN FINDING THAT EX-
lillHT 15 IS A VALID CONTRACT. AND IN 
RESTHAIXING DEFENDANT FROl\I l\IAK-
ING ANY ATTACJil\IEXTS TO OR l\IODIFI-
CATIOXS OF THE 'V ATER SYSTEl\I. 
In its Complaint, pl:mtiff claimed only an ease-
ment for repair awl maintenance of the 'vater system. 
After the trial, however, the Association ma<le the claim 
that "Plaintiff's witnesses testified, that from the be-
ginning, the Developer promised to conVc,1/ the water 
systc m (together with easements of access) to the As-
sociation in consideration of the Association's undertak-
ing to maintain it and assure its continued operability." 
( H. 117.) (Emphasis added.) No such evidence exists 
in the record. Three witnesses called by the plaintiff 
testified as to the organization meeting of the plaintiff 
.Association (at which this promise allegedly was ma<le. 
R. 15().) Parley Pike, plaintiff's witness, testified 
that Bateman's lawyer stated that I3ateman desired to 
form the group " ... to take over the maintenance and 
operation of the roads and the water system, keeping 
them in good repair, and to do other domestic duties 
11 
such as garbage collection ... " (R. 182.) (Emphasis 
ad<led.) 
Charles 1\1. Neve (plaintiff's witness) stated that 
those present at the organization meeting of the plain-
tiff Association were told by lVIr. Jfateman " ... Once 
the Association is formed I can then turn over the 
water rights . ... " (R. 196.) (Emphasis added.) 
Paul .J. Carpenter (plaintiff's witness and presi-
dent of the plaintiff Association at the time of trial) 
testified that at the organization meeting, Bateman's ah. - . __ :, 
torney, David Salisbury, did the talking and that he said 
Bateman ". . . had heretofore been maintaining the 
water system, he had been doing all things connected 
with the water. He had put in the roads. Problems in 
connection with the roads and access from the highway, 
that he had assumed the responsibility for that. That he 
was now divorcing himself from those responsibilities, 
and he was turning the whole thing over to the Associa-
tion for which they would be responsible .... " (R. 211, 
212.) 
No other witness testified as to the organization 
meeting of the Association and specifically no witness 
testified nor was there other evidence introduced (ex-
cept Exhibit 15 which will be discussed later) which 
showed that Bateman, the Developer corporation, or 
the defendant corporation had ever promised to convey 
the water system to the Association. 
The invitation which Bateman sent to the lot own-
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crs i1ffitir1g them to attend the organization meeting of 
the corporation did not contain any promise to convey 
the water system to the Association, hut stated that 
mai11tc11a11cc of water lines would be discussed. (Ex-
hibit :3.) 
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Di-
rectors and members of the plaintiff Association (Ex-
hibit n) also indicate that no representation was ever 
made to the effect Bateman would convey the water 
s.11stcm (as opposed to the water rights) to the Associa-
tion. 
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors dated February 8, 1963, disclose the following: 
"The purpose of this meeting was to discuss 
the water situation at Aspen Acres and to ex-
amine the water rights which had been trans-
ferred to us from .l\Iax Bateman and Aspen 
. Acres, Inc. The water problem was discussed 
at great length and the water rights and titles 
were accepted as transferred. A motion was 
made, seconded and unanimously carried: 
UESOL \rED: The water rights as re-
ceived are now accepted as transferred to us 
with thanks to l\Iax Bateman for giving us 
these rights. 
* * * * * 
"It was su ggcstcd that we also secure from 
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1llr. Bateman a transfer of title of his interest 
in the present water system and any future 
water system that he could install in this area." 
(R. 131.) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, it is uncontroverted and clearly established 
by the evidence presented by plaintiff that the direc-
tors of the plaintiff Association knew at or about the 
time of the organization of the Association that they 
had acquired no title to the water system from the De-
veloper or Bateman and that he had not promised to 
convey the water system to the plaintiff Association~ 
The sole evidence admitted in the record which 
would sustain a finding by the Court that plaintiff is 
entitled to a cmweyance of the water system was con-
tained in Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 purports to be a con-
tract between plaintiff and dfendant dated .l\Iay 22, 
1963. Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 15 state as follows: 
"6. At such time as Associates acquire title to 
the water rights and water system including 
tanks and equipment and right-of-ways per-
taining thereto, that it will transfer said rights, 
system, tanks, equipment and right-of-ways to 
the Association, which Association then agrees 
to assume full responsibility in connection with 
the maintenance, development and operation of 
such water system." 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the Lower Court found Exhibit 15 to be a binding con-
14 
tract (R. 101). Defendant urges that this finding of 
the Court ancl the additional findings which are inci-
dental thereto were erro11eous for the following reasons: 
1. The m1contrm'ertecl evidence showed that all 
elements of a hi11di11g contract 1vere not present with 
respect to Exhibit 15. 
2. The minutes of tlie plaintiff Association and 
defendant do not !-.how that Exhibit 15 as written was 
ever approved by either corporation. 
:3. The conduct of the plailltiff Association after 
.:\Jay 22, HH>7, is inconsistent with its claim that Exhibit 
15 was a valid, hi11ding contract. 
4. The plai11tiff should be estopped to assert the 
validity of Exhibit 15 by reason of its admissions under 
oath in Answers to Interrogatories. 
These points will he argued in order. 
1. 11hc 1111co11trot•crtc£l ct'idencc showed that all 
l'lc111c11ts of a binding contract were not present with 
rcN JJcct to lt',i·hibi t l 5. 
Defendant alleges that the evidence shows that 
Exhibit 15 was never approved by defendant and that 
it was never delivered by defendant to plaintiff. Only 
two witnesses testified with respect to Exhibit 1.5. That 
Exhibit was introduced i11to evidence through the testi-
15 
mony of Kenneth L. Stahr. l\Ir. Stahr was an executive 
officer of both plaintiff and defendant on l\lay 22, 
Hrn3, the date Exhibit 15 was allegedly entered into. 
l\Ir. Stahr was called as an adverse witness by plain-
tiff Association for the sole purpose of introducing Ex-
hibit 15. l\I r. Stahr identified the signatures on Exhibit 
15 as being his own (on behalf of plaintiff Association) 
and 'Valton R. Farmer's (on behalf of the defendant) 
( R. 2HH.) However, he testified that the Agreement 
was never approved by the defendant corporation (R. 
204), that it was signed by l\lr. Farmer without any 
authority from the defendant corporation (R. 266, 27.5) 
and denied that the Agreement was delivered to him 
(on behalf of the plaintiff Association) ( R. 266.) He 
also denied that the Board of Directors of Seven As-
sociates ever authorized Farmer to deliYer the }~xhibit 
to the plaintiff .. Association (R. 275), and when ques-
tioned as to how the Exhibit got into the possession of 
the plaintiff Association, he stated that that document 
along with others had been lost by l\Ir. Farmer at a 
meeting held in Farmer's cabin in the Aspen Acres Sub-
division. Ile explained that Farmer had placed those 
documents in a folder which he placed on top of his car 
and subsequently lost when he left the area (R. 275.) 
'V alton Farmer was subsequently called as a wit-
ness by the defendant. He testified that he had been a 
dirctor and the treasurer of the defendant corporation, 
but that he was not at the time of the trial an officer or 
director of the defendant (R. 397.) He further testi-
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fiecl that at the time of the trial he had no pecumary 
interest in the defendant corporation (H. 41~.) 
l\I r. Farmer testified that he had signe<l the docu-
ment while sitting in an attorney's office in Salt Lake 
City (H. 410) but that no members of the Uoarcl of 
Directors of the plaintiff .Association were present at 
that time ( R. 41.) He further testified that the Board 
of Directors of defendant corporation did not authorize 
the delivery of Exhibit 15, but that the Uoard of Di-
rectors of def ernlant corporation declined to accept the 
Agreement. (R. 411, 412.) \Vhen asked if he knew 
lww the document might have come into the possession 
of the plaintiff .Association, he responded that at a 
meeting held at the cabin on the mountainside (Aspen 
Acres Subdivision), he had a portfolio of papers. Dur-
ing the meeting they were left on the hack of his car, 
" ... arnl we came out, and when we got to Salt Lake 
we couldn't find the papers. The who]e portfolio was 
gone." He identified Exhibit 15 as being included in 
that lost portfolio. ( H. ·H 2.) No other witness testified 
with respect to Exhibit 15. 
It is elementary that the mere execution of a con-
tl'c~ct "·ithout a valid delivery thereof does not create 
a binding contract. (See 17 C.J. S. p. 735, Contracts 
Sedion ti-1< and cases cited therein.) 
At the trial the plaintiff purposely avoided call-
ing its own witness to introduce Exhibit 15 or testify 
as to the circumstances under which Exhibit 15 came 
into the possession of the plaintiff even though counsel 
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for the plaintiff was admonished by the Court that a 
presumption might be raised against plaintiff's position 
by reason of its failure to do so. It is a well-established 
rule that where relevant evidence which would properly 
be part of a case is within control of the party in whose 
interest it would naturally be to produce it, and he fails 
to do so without satisfactory explanation, the Court may 
draw an inference that such evidence would have been 
unfavorable to such party. See Bowe v. Palmer, 36 U. 
214, 102 Pac. 1007 (1909). See also 29 Am. Jur. 2d 
p. 220 et seq, Evidence, Sections 175, et seq. 
Similarly, it is the rule that where a party has the 
means in his power of repudiating or explaining evi-
dence adduced against him, the failure to do so furnishes 
a strong presumption or inference that he cannot do so. 
See nlamrnoth Oil Company v. United States, 275 U.S. 
13, 48 S. Ct. l, 72 L. ed. 137 ( 1927). 
Also, if a party knows of the existence of an avail-
able witness on a material issue, and such witness is 
within his control, and if, without satisfactory explana-
tion, he fails to call him, the Court may draw the in-
ference that the testimony of the witness would not have 
been favorable to such party. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d p. 
224, Evidence, Sec. 180, and cases cited therein. 
It has been held within the meaning of the fore-
O'Oino· rule that the failure of the corporate party to 
b b , 
produce testimony available through its officers or di-
rectors justifies an inference adverse to such party. See 
Sullivan vs. Idaho Wholesale Company, 43 Ida. 149, 
18 
2..J.fl Pac. 8!)5 (I H2o), together with cases collected m 
an .A11notation in ;j() .A LH 2d !>07. Section .'). 
l 11 this matter it shoul<l he obvious that the plain-
tiff had available to it some witness, probably an officer 
or director, who could testify as to the circumstances 
under which it obtained possession of Exhibit 15. 
Yet plain ti ff made no attempt to controvert the 
testimony of witnesses Stahr awl Farmer that the 
document had 11evcr been deli,·ered, evu1 though plain-
tiff \\·as put on notice in the opening statement of de-
fe11da11t that de f'endant's witnesses would testify that 
the dm_·11me11t hall been lost aIHl ne,·er deli,·erecl. (H. 172, 
17:3.) 1\.ecordi11gly, it should be inferred that had the 
plaintiff called their witness to testify under oath, his 
testimony \Wmhl have been ach·erse to the plaintiff As-
sociation; that is. that he would testify that someone 
fouwl Exhibit 15 after \Yalton Farmer lost it and gave 
it to the .Association. This does not amount to a valid 
delivery. 
Certainly the Court is not justified in finding that 
Exhibit 15 is a hirnling contract against the uncontro-
vertecl testimony that it was never delivered to the plain-
tiff. 
2. 1'he 111in11t('.1; of the jJlai11tif'f A.{/sociation and 
defendant do not shore that E,rhihit 15 as written •was 
C"l'l'I" approt•ed b,11 either corporation. 
Both Ke1111eth L. Stahr aIHl 'Valton Farmer testi-
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fied that Exhibit 15 was not approved by the lfoarcl of 
Directors of Seven Associates, Inc. The minute book 
of SeYen Associates, luc. was introduced into evidence 
(Exhibit 25) and confirms their testimony inasmuch 
as none of the minutes therein show an approval of Ex-
hibit L3. The minutes o fthe plaintiff Association (Ex-
hibit 9) contain several minutes having a bearing on 
hihit 15. The minutes of the plaintiff Association (Ex-
or its substance. The minutes of a meeting elated May 1, 
1 !Hi3, contain a resolution for an agreement which tlie 
plaintiff Association proposed to Seven Associates, Inc. 
However, the minutes of a subsequent meeting elated 
~I ay 20, 196:J, disclose that the proposed agreement 
''. . . was returned to us and i n c 1 u de cl several 
changes .... " At Jaw, this would not constitute an ac-
ceptance hut only a counter offer. The minutes of the 
meeting of l\Iay 20, 1963, further disclosed that after 
a considerable cliscussion, the Board of Directors of 
plaintiff Association made several substantial changes 
in the returned proposal which they then re-submitted 
to the defendant corporation for approval. This would 
constitute another counter offer. Kenneth L. Stahr 
testi ficd that Exhibit 17 set· out in full the revised res-
olution as prepared by the plaintiff Association at their 
meeting on l\lay 20, 1963, and re-submitted to defend-
ant. (R. 272.) Exhibit 17 has a handwritten entry which 
Mr. Stahr stated was written by him at the time of the 
meetin<r at the time the Uoard of Directors of Seven 
b 
Associates met to consider the counter-proposal from 
plaintiff Association dated l\'Iay 20, 1963. (R. 273.) 
20 
The hand-written material notes as follows: "Not ap-
proved by 7 Associates Inc. l\Ieeting l\Iay 8, 1963, 
he cause of differences encountered by both sides it was 
decided to drop further discussion on this particular 
proposal. Kenneth Stahr, Secretary." (See Exhibit 17.) 
It should also be noted that the resolution finally 
approved hy the plaintiff Association on l\Iay 20, 1963, 
only resembles Exhibit 15 in some parts and there is no 
other minute entry any where in the records of the 
plaintiff Association which indicates that Exhibit 15 
itself was ever considered and approved by the Board 
of Directors of the plaintiff Association. 
3. 'l'hc conduct of the plaintiff Association after 
1llay 22, 19t>7, iN i11co11,11istc11t tcith its claim that E<d1ibit 
15 was a 'l'alid, binding contract. 
Several of the minutes of the plaintiff Associa-
tion (Exhibit 9) an<l written proposals of plaintiff As-
sociation to defendant following l\Iay 22, 19()3, consti-
tute a recognition that the plaintiff Association did not 
feel it had acquired any rights in the water system as 
of l\Iay 22, 190:3. The minutes of the meeting held No-
vember 17, l9HH (Exhibit 9) recite that the Board of 
Directors of the plaintiff Association apprO\'ed an agree-
ment prepared by Frank Allen for the plaintiff Asso-
ciation. This Agreement was introduced into evidence as 
Exhibit 8. The whole purpose of the proposed agree-
ment was to obtain the consent of the defendant for the 
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plaintiff to exercise certain acts of control over the 
water system. 
Sec also the minutes of l\Iay 3, 1!)()7, (Exhibit 9) 
in which Paul Carpenter advised all members of the 
Association in a general meeting" ... that a good work-
ing arrangement was neeclecl on a sound legal basis be-
tween Aspen .Acres Association who owns the water 
rights, awl the Seven Associates, who may have the 
ownership of the system." He further reported that at-
torneys for the plaintiff and the defendant were 
" ... working up an agreement to be approYed by ti,rr 
Board of Directors of each company." (Emphasis add-
ed.) This is patently inconsistent with the plaintiff's 
claim that it alread,11 had an agreement (i.e. Exhibit 15). 
4. The plaintiff should be estoppcd to assert the 
validity of E,rliibit 15 by reason of its admissions under 
oath in A nswcrs to I11terrogatorics. 
On .May 28, 1971, defendant, through its counsel, 
se1Tecl upon plaintiff, through its counsel, a Request 
for Admissions and Interrogatories. In the Interroga-
tories, clefenclant asked whether the plaintiff has entered 
into any written agreements with Aspen Acres, Inc. or 
with l\Iax Bateman as an individual, or with the heirs 
and successors in interest of l\Iax Bateman (other than 
the agreement by which the water rights were trans-
ferred to plaintiff.) Defendant requested (if that in-
terrogatory be answered in the affirmative) that the 
plaintiff identify such other written agreements. Plain-
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tiff answered that interrogatory on July 22, 1971, as 
follows: "Plaintiff is aware of no other written instru-
ment entitled "Agreement" executed by both plaintiff 
and, either Bateman, or the def cndant, or any other heirs 
or successors in interest of ~Iax Bateman." (R. 59.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
In response to defendant's request to identify any 
other written agreements, the plaintiff did identify 
some written instruments (none of which were agree-
nmts) which it intended to rely upon, hut failed to 
identify the alleged agreement which was later intro-
duced into evidence as Exhibit 15. (R .. 59.) Defendant 
was not informed of the existence of Exhibit 15 until 
the night hef ore the trial. All of this was explained to 
the Trial Court in chambers by the attorneys for plain-
tiff and defendant at the conunencement of the trial, 
and alluded to in defendant's opening statement. (R. 
172.) 
Consequently, the state of the record before this 
Court is: 
(a) The uncontroverted testimony of 
the only witnesses who testified about Exhibit 
15 is to the effect that the agreement was 
never in fact delivered to the plaintiff Asso-
ciation, but rather it was lost and apparently 
found by someone ·who delivered it to the 
plaintiff Association. 
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( b) That the minute hooks of both 
plaintiff and defendant disclose that the agree-
ment was never apprm·ed hy either corporation. 
( c) That the conduct of the parties, and 
particularly the plaintiff Association after 
.JUay 22, 19G:3, was inconsistent with plaintiff's 
claim that Exhibit 15 was valid and binding 
upon the parties. 
( d) That the plaintiff under oath de-
nied the existence of any agreement such as 
Exhibit rn between plaintiff and defendant. 
( e) Finally, that the plaintiff failed to 
explain how Exhibit 15 came into its posses-
sion under circumstances which should raise an 
inference against the position of the plaintiff 
Association. 
In view of the foregoing, there is no evidence in 
the record to sustain the finding of the Trial Court that 
Exhibit 15 was a valid and enforceable agreement. 
There was no other evidence before the Court which 
would justify the judgment awarding ownership of the 
water system to the plaintiff corporation and ordering 
defendants to convey the water system and its appur-
tenant parts to the plaintiff Association or restraining 
th~ defendant from making any attachments or modifi-
cations to its own system. 
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In view of the evidence, the Court should have en-
terecl its order awarding ownership of the water system 
to the defendant, awl the only restraint the Court should 
have put upon the right of the defendant to modify or 
extend the system should be that no such modifications 
or extensions should he made which would unreasonably 
interfere with the delivery of water to the members of 
the plaintiff Association. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN 
UJL\XTINC~ TIIE PLAINTIFF ASSOCIA-
TION TIIE RIGIIT TO CONTROL THE 
E.ASEl\IENTS 'VITlIIN AND 'VITIIOUT 
THE SUBDIYISION, AND IN }'AILING TO 
GlL\NT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN 
EASEMENT ACROSS TIIE ROADS WITHIN 
TIIE SUBDIVISION FOR ACCESS TO ITS 
LANDS O'VNED llY DEFENDANT. 
This point will he argued in two division as follows: 
(a) The Court erred in granting the plaintiff 
Association the right to control easements within and 
without the subdivision. 
( b) The Court erred in failing to recognize the 
defendant's right to an easement across the roads within 
the subdivision for access to said lands. 
(a) The Court erred in granting the plaintiff As-
sociation the right tr,; control the easements within and 
without the subdivision. 
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The Court in its judgment recognized an easement 
m favor " ... of the members of plaintiff association 
and all lot owners in now or hereafter subdivided 
areas .... " across the roadway leading from the public 
highway into the subdivided areas. This point was never 
and is not now contested by defendant which has never 
sought to restrict or limit this right. 
However, in paragraph two of the Judgment, the 
Court also stated: 
"'Vith reference to said easement and as trustee 
for said lot owners, plaintiff has the following rights: 
* * * * * 
"(h) The right to make reasonable regula-
tions governing the kinds of vehicles and loads 
permitted upon the road and restricting access 
to owners of land within the tract and their 
invitees. 
" ( c) The right to erect and maintain access 
control devices at the highway in the imple-
mentation of reasonable regulations governing 
nccess control." 
The right to control access to these easements was 
granted to the plaintiff Association even though the 
uncontroverted evidence before the Court demonstrates 
that the plaintiff Association represents only the own-
ers of 111 lots out of a total of 161 lots in the subdi-
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vision which existed 011 September 12, 19{)2. (See R. t>l-
05.) 
The Court erroneously, we believe, took the posi-
tion that the right of the plaintiff Association flowed 
from the Developer because of the activities of _Max 
Bateman in connection with the organization of the 
plaintiff Association. Yet, all of the evidence introduced 
with respect to the organization of the plaintiff Asso-
ciation showed that J\lax Bateman and his personal at-
torney, David Salisbury (rather than the corporate at-
torney Reed Tuft who also was a 50% owner of the 
Developer corporation) were the ones who fostered the 
organization of the plaintiff Association. No evidence 
"as introduced indicating that the Developer corpora-
tion (as opposed to .:\lax Bateman iw1ividually) organ-
ized the plaintiff .Association. Furthermore, it is ap-
parent from the record that as of September 12, 1962, 
the date of the organization of the plaintiff Associa-
tion, a substantial number of lots had been sold and less 
than 50% of the lot owners chose to join the plaintiff 
J\ ssociation. (See :Exhibit 9 -- J\linutes of General 
J\lemhership l\Ieeting held September 26, 1962, where-
in it was stated: "The next item of business concerned 
finances. The secretary advised that the paid-up mem-
bership to date was less than 50% of the potential." 
(Emphasis added.) Also, compare the Articles of In-
corporation of plaintiff Association contained in Ex-
hibit 9 which bear the signatures of forty-eight lot own-
ers as original incorporators.) 
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Defendant respectfully submits that the plaintiff 
Association is actually a voluntary association of some 
hut by no means all of the lot owners in the subdivision. 
In Answers to Interrogatories, plaintiff Association 
admitted that it had not obtained any right to control 
the access from the owners of lots who were not mem-
bers of the plaintiff Association (R. 6~5, 66.) Conse-
q11cntly, the rights of the plaintiff Association are not 
greater than the rights of its members, and they are the 
only ones the Association has the right to represent .. 
Actually, however, all owners of property withi11 
the one-half section tract known as "Aspen Acres" are 
owners in common of all of the easements created with-
in the tract. The Jaw in Utah and elsewhere is well-
establishe<l that an owner in common of an easement 
cannot make alterations which will render the easement 
appreciably less convenient and useful to any of its co-
tenants. See Hig Cottonwood 1.1anncr Ditch Company 
ti. 1lloyle, 109 U. 213, 174 P.2d 148, 172 A.L.R. 175 
(194G). 
Accordingly, neither the lot owners who are mem-
bers of the Association (including the plaintiff as their 
representative) nor the lot owners who are not members 
of the Association nor the defendant as co-tenants of 
the easement in question could control or restrict the use 
of the easement by others, except by mutual consent of 
all. 
Defendant would not object to the construction of 
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a gate or other device to control or restrict the access 
upon the terms mutually agreeable to all property own-
ers within the tract. Defendant does, however, object 
to the unilateral exercise of control upon terms deter-
mined solely by the Association. The record discloses 
that other property owners (non-members of the plain-
tiff Association) have also objected to the manner in 
",:hich the Association has restricted access. (R. 335.) 
Since the members of the Association individually 
could not take it upon themselYes to restrict the access 
of the other property owners, the Association should not 
be permitted to do so by its unilateral determination and 
the Lower Court committed error in granting this right 
to the Association. 
(b) 11he Court erred in failing to grant defendant 
an casement across the roads in the subdivision. 
Exhibit 1 is a drawing showing the one-half section 
tract which is the subject of this suit. Exhibit 1 shows 
the roads within the subdivision as well as those giving 
access to the subdivision and those which lie beyond the 
subdivision. Exhibit 1 also shows by the area in blue 
the lands owned by the defendant corporation. As will 
he seen from Exhibit 1, the defendant corporation owns 
lands which are cut off from the public highway by the 
lands comprising the subdivision. Consequently, de-
fendant sought in its counter-claim to have the Court 
award it an easement for access to and from its prop-
erties. (R. 19 Paragraph 8 (2) .) In post-trial memo-
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randum, plaintiff conceded the defendant's right to 
use of the roads within the subdivision for access. (R. 
116.) The Lower Court in its Judgment, however, failed 
to make any decision with respect to this issue. 
Defendant contends that it is entitled to an ease-
ment across the roads in the subdivision for access to 
the lands lying beyond the subdivision upon either of 
two theories: 
(a) That defendant is entitled to an easement 
created by express reservation, or 
(b) Defendant is entitled to an easement by im-
plication. 
(a) That defendant is entitled to an easement 
created by e.vpress reservation. 
As stated previously, the real estate contracts by 
which lots were sold within the subdivision contained an 
express reservation of an easement" ... for the use and 
benefit of any person now owning or who 1nay acquire 
property in the tract known as Aspen Acres.'' (Exhibits 
10, 18, 19, 28) (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant respectfully contends that the forego-
ing wording is sufficient to include the developer at 
that time and the defendant corporation which pur-
chased the same property from the Developer. 
(b) Defendant is entitled to an easement by impli-
cation. 
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The general law as well as the law in Utah recoO'· 
0 
nize the creation of the way of necessity under certain 
conditions. A way of necessity is an easement f ouncled 
upon an implied grant or reservation of the easement. 
It arises where there is a conveyance of a part of a tract 
of land of such nature and extent that either the part 
conveyed or the part retained is shut off from access 
to a road to the outer world by the land from which it 
is served or by this land and the land of stranger. 
Under such circumstances there is an implied grant or 
rese1Tation of an easement across the land conveyed or 
retained. See Sm•age v. Nielsen, 114 U. 22, 197 P.2d 117 
( 1948) . The requirements to establish a way of neces-
sity are two-fold: 
I. Showing that the dominant and senient estates 
were under common ownership at sometime, and 
2. That the servient estate was severed from the 
dominant estate in such manner as to cut off the access 
of the dominant estate of the road. (See 25 Am. Jur. 
tel pp. 448-50, Easements, Section 35.) 
'fhe uncontroverted evidence in this case discloses 
that the whole one-half section tract was under the own-
ership of Aspen Acres, Inc., the Developer corporation, 
arnl that said Developer corporntion developed the sub-
divided areas. Exhibit l further demonstrates that the 
subdivided areas completely close off the access to the 
lands lying beyond the subdivision. 
Accordingly, defendant respectfully contends that 
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it is entitled to an easement over the roads within the 
subdivision for access to its lands lying beyond the sub-
division either because the defendant is included within 
the express reservation contained in the real estate con-
tracts or by the implied reservation of an easement by 
necessity. 
POINT III. THE. COURT ERRED IN 
HOLDING TI-I AT DEI<"'ENDANT :MUST 
GUARANTEE THE DUTIES \iVHICH THE 
PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION OWES TO ITS 
~IElHBERS, AND IN ESTOPPING DEFEND-
ANT FRO.M DENYING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF ASSOCIATION IS ITS AGENT. 
In the }-.indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the Court found: 
"The Association was sponsored by the 
Developer and many, but not all, of the lot 
owners. The Developer has delegated to said 
Association certain rights with the related 
duties ... (R. 98.) 
"The Association acquires duties of main-
tenance of easements for the ingress and egress 
and for water lines as lot owners come into 
existence .... (R. 99.) 
" ... The Seven Associates has the duties 
of the developer created by all its dealings with 
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lot owners and those d cl e gated to the A ssocia-
tion . ... It also has a <luty to each lot owner 
to whom it sells to guarantee performance hy 
the Association of its duties. ( R. 100.) (Em-
phasis added.) 
"The Developer has the <luty to maintain 
the roads and water service, although by con-
tract, the Association has acquired the same 
duty. 
"Set·cn Associates are liable for all of 
Developer's duties owed to the lot owners. (R. 
l 01.) (Emphasis added.) 
"Developer and Seven Associates are 
estopped from denying that the reasonable ac-
tivities of the Association are the acts of the 
Developer and Seven Associates. This consti-
tutes an agency." (R. 101.) 
Defe11dant contends that these findings are con-
trary to the law and the evidence in this case. For clar-
ity, these matters will he argued under two headings: 
(a) The Court erred in finding that defendant is 
a guarantor of the duties of the Association to its mem-
bers or other lot owners, and 
( b) The Court erred in finding that the def end-
ant is estopped from denying the plaintiff Association 
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is its agent and that the reasonable activities of the 
plaintiff Association are its acts. 
(a) The Court erred in finding that def end ant i.v 
a guarantor of the duties of the Association to its mem-
bers or other lot owners. 
The plaintiff Association was incorporated on Sep-
tember 12, 19C2. The defendant corporation was incor-
porated in l\Iareh of 1963, and its first dealings with the 
Developer were the negotiation and consumation of the 
contract of sale on l\larch 27, 1!)63. (Exhibit 16.) By 
the terms of Exhibit 16, defendant agreed to purchase 
from the Developer certain real property which amount-
ed to eighteen specific lots within the subdivided area, 
plus the undeveloped land in the half section tract then 
owned by the Developer. An examination of that Ex-
hibit will disclose that the defendant corporation did 
not agree to assume any of the responsibilities of the 
Developer toward the plaintiff Association or toward 
other lots or lot owners other than the responsibility to 
run a water line to fifteen lots which were specifically 
identified in the agreement, four of which were being 
purchased by the defendant under the terms of the same 
contract. 
The Court apparently assumed that by the terms 
of Exhibit 16, defendant purchased all of the rights 
and liabilities of the Developer arising out of its prior 
dealings with land not being purchased by the defendant 
(i.e. lots previously sold to others). Yet, there is noth-
ing in the contract or in the other evidence presented in 
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the trial which indicates that the defendant agreed to 
assume any other responsibilities. 
For all that appears in the contract or in the evi-
dence, the defendant was in exactly the same position 
as the other lot owners in that the defendant also pur-
chased lots from the Developer (as well as purchasing 
the undeveloped areas in the one-half section tract 
:>wnecl by the Developer). If this contract imposes upon 
the defendant the burden of assuming all of the obliga-
tions of the Developer toward lot owners who previous-
ly purchased lots from the Developer, then it would 
follow that all of the other lot owners assumed similar 
obligations with respect to each lot owner previously 
purchasing a lot from the Developer. Similarly, it would 
also follow rea<;onably that the same obligation should 
be incurred by everyone who subsequently purchases a 
lot either from the <lefendaut or from any of the other 
lot owners. 
The policy of the law, of course, is against impos-
ing secret obligations on purchasers of real estate. This 
should more especially be the case where, as here, the 
obli()'ations are not clearly defined and may be subject 
b • 
to enlargement as new situations arise not contemplated 
at the time of the transfer of property. 
Defendant does not object to standing behind any 
obligations which it specifically undertakes by contracts 
or deed with lot owners purchasing their lot from de-
fendant. However, defendant does object to the imposi-
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tion by the Court upon the defendant of any obliga-
tions undertaken by the Developer in its contracts, par-
ticularly where no evidence was presented showing that 
the defendant succeeded to the rights of the Developer 
with respect to the lots sold by the Developer to other 
lot owners. 
The uncontroverted evidence which was presented 
by witnesses for plaintiff shows that the purpose of the 
formation of the plaintiff Association was so that the 
plaintiff Association could take over the road mainten-
ance and water rights and other duties theretofore per-
formed by .Max Bateman. 
Therefore, the proper holding should be that the 
plaintiff Association (and not the defendant) became 
the guarantor of the duties of .Max I-Jateman or the De-
veloper with respect to the lot owners purchasing the 
lots from Bateman or the Developer. The defendant 
corporation should be put in that position if at all, only 
with respect to any duties specifically assumed by it on 
behalf of lot owners purchasing from the defendant. 
(b) The C01irt erred in finding that the def end-
ant is estopped from denying the plaintiff Association 
is its agent and that the reasonable activities of the plain-
tiff Association arc its acts. 
The finding by the Lower Court in the instant case 
that the defendant was estopped from denying the plain-
tiff Association is its agent, is beyond the issues raise<l 
by the pleadings and is totally unsupported by an evi-
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dence. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Public 
Utilities Commission v. Jones, .54 U. Ill, 179, Pac. 754 
( l!H n), defined estoppel as relating to a situation where 
"A person is held to a representation made, or a position 
assumed, where otherwise inequitable consequences 
would result to another who, having the right to do so 
under all the circumstances of the case, has, in good 
faith relied thereon." 
No e\ridence was presented nor was it even asserted 
hy the plaintiff that the defendant had ever represented 
to anyone or assumed a position consistent with the rep-
resentation that the plaintiff Association was the agent 
of the defendant. Furthermore, the record is totally 
devoid of any evidence indicating that any inequitable 
consequence would result to the Association or to anyone 
else if the defendant were permitted to deny that the 
plaintiff Association is its agent as opposed to being the 
ngent of the lot owners "\vl10 are members of the plain-
tiff Association. 
An examination of all of the relevant evidence in 
this case will disclose that at all times the plaintiff As-
sociation has taken a position in opposition to the rights 
asserted by defendant, and it has never purported to be 
the a()'ent or other re1)resentative of the defendant. 
<:""' 
The findings of the Court places the defendant in 
the anomalous position of having an agent which it did 
not appoint, which it cannot control and apparently (be-
cause of the estoppel) which it cannot terminate; yet 
this "agent" consistently takes a position adverse to the 
interests of the defendant. 
Defendant respectfully submits that no proper pur-
pose is served by the Court's findings because anyone 
with whom defendant has dealt has a direct right of 
action against defendant in the event of default or prej-
udicial damage. 
Defendant is particularly apprehensive as to the 
Court's finding that it is estopped from denying that 
the reasonable activities of the plaintiff Association are 
the acts of the defendant with respect to future actions 
of plaintiff. This finding could obviously subject the 
defendant to claims from limitless persons for liabilities 
which may be created by the activities of the plaintiff. 
In each instance, the sole defense of the defendant cor-
poration would depend upon the reasonableness of the 
activities of the plaintiff over which the defendant has 
no control. Consequently, that finding amounts to an 
arbirtrary and capricious action and an abuse of discre-
tion by the Court. Since it is not supported by any evi-
dence, it should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant re-
spectfully submits that this Honorable Court should 
enter its order: 
I. Reversing the determination of the Trial Court 
that the plaintiff owns the water system and its com-
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poncnt parts and awarding the same to the defendant. 
For the same reasons, the Court should reverse the de-
termination of the Trial Court that Exhibit 15 is a valid 
contract and that the defendant is restrained from mak-
mg any attachment to or modification of the 'vater 
system. 
2. Reversing the determination of the Trial Court 
awarding plaintiff the right to control the easements 
situatecl within the one-half section tract known as 
"Aspen Acres." This Court should also by its decision 
award defendant an easement across the roads within 
the su hdivision for access to its lands lying beyond the 
suhdhrision. 
3. Reversing the determination of the Lower 
Court that the defendant must guarantee the duties 
which the plaintiff owes to its members and other lot 
owners and also reverse the determination of the Trial 
Court that the defendant is estopped from denying that 
plaintiff is its agent and that the reasonable activities 
of the plaintiff are the acts of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TUFT & lHARSHALL 
JOHN G. lVIARSHALL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
